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First, thanks to Syracuse University, especially to the History Department and the 
organizers of this conference, Junko Takeda and Laurie Marhoefer, for inviting me to talk. 
Today’s conference has been a wonderful opportunity to learn about some of the exciting ways 
in which young scholars, graduate students, are exploring the tensions between power and 
powerlessness, authority, submission and resistance in fields of cultural, social, political and 
economic history. Although it is broad, or because it is broad, this topic provides the opportunity 
for discussion not only across geographic and chronological boundaries within the field of 
history, but also across sub-disciplines.  
Let me start with a story. In 1227, the count and archbishop of Zadar orchestrated an 
assault on the heart of their own city, situated on the north-east coast of the Adriatic—not a 
military onslaught, but an attack on the civic rituals that defined the community. The count went 
personally in procession to the city’s monasteries and churches and demanded to be blessed by 
the head of each of them. The abbess of the convent of Sveta Marija gave this damning 
testimony: 
He asked me for new honors, that I should invite and summon him to the feast of my 
convent. I was to receive him at the entrance with holy water, incense, crucifix, chrism 
and the other ecclesiastical festive apparatus. When I said no, he said, ‘Now I demand 
and desire the honor that this be done for me at the monastery of St. Chrysogonus and all 
the monasteries and all the churches of Zadar that are able to do it. Our lord archbishop 
ordered this be done.’1  
 
The abbot of Sveti Krsevan (Chrysogonus) would later complain to the papal curia that this act 
constituted these acts to be “perverse customs to be abolished.” He added the further opinion that 
this deed was only a means to an end; by demanding that he, as ruler of the city, be included in 
                                                 
1 T. Smičiklas, ed. Codex Diplomaticus Regni Dalmatiae, Chroatiae et Slavoniae (Zagreb: Dioničke Tiskare, 1905), 
vol. III, 280-281. 
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the rituals of the city’s churches Dandolo and Gardiaca subjected them to “the yoke of 
servitude.”2 
What did Abbot Damianus mean by that? This was not just a simple case of church 
versus state; the fact that the archbishop sided with the count against the monasteries tells us that. 
To answer that we need to look at the identities of accused aggressors. Neither Count Marino 
Dandolo nor Archbishop Johannes Gardiaca were from Zadar themselves; they were Venetian. 
They represented (officially for Dandolo and unofficially for Gardiaca) the republic of Venice, 
and enforced the subordination of Zadar to its richer and more powerful neighbor across the 
Adriatic. Only a generation before, Venice had bargained the knights of the Fourth Crusade into 
seizing Zadar (Zara) for them; this had been the first step in what many historians consider a 
crusade gone awry—one in which the Christian empire of Constantinople became the target of 
Crusader conquest, rather than the Islamic enemy in Egypt and the Levant.3 For the Zaratines, it 
was a grievous error in and of itself. Zadar still seethed resentfully against Venetian dominion; 
less than two decades later it would erupt once more in rebellion.4 
Still, despite the characterization by the complaining clergy of the act as an attack, the 
attempt to create a new religious and civic ritual was not intrinsically destructive or malicious. 
Instead, from the point of view of Gardiaca and Dandolo, this was an innovative means by which 
to integrate the Venetian governor of the city into the fabric of its civic life. They meant to take 
an existing set of rituals (the special feast days of the ecclesiastical patrons) and adapt them to 
                                                 
2 Smičiklas, III, 277. 
3 For the standard account of the Fourth Crusade, see Donald Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: 
the conquest of Constantinople (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 2nd Ed. 
4 For the Dalmatian and Croatian perspective of the Fourth Crusade, see Giuseppe Praga, History of Dalmatia (Pisa: 
Giardini, 1993), trans. Edward Steinberg, 95-101; and Tomislav Raukar, Hrvatsko Srednjovjekovlje: prostor, ljudi, 
ideje (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1997), 71. 
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the new reality of Venetian sovereignty. In this way they hoped to direct Zaratine loyalties 
towards at very least Venetian governors and archbishops, and hopefully to Venice itself. 
This tale of subjugation and resistance in which the Venetians attempted to articulate 
their authority over Zadar operates through several different levels of communication: through 
cultural ritual, through religious dogma, through legislation and administration and through 
coercive threat of violence. In this talk, I will examine the different forums through which 
aspirants to dominance and potential submissive (tops and bottoms, to borrow the language of 
pornography discussed by Quin Shakra) debated the terms of their relationship. The trick is in 
finding a language that both sides understand. 
Although authority figures tend to portray dominion in terms of the successful and 
conclusive use of coercive power (conquest, revolution, battle, etc.), the imposition of authority 
depends just as much upon the continual persuasion of subjects to acknowledge as legitimate the 
powers that be. Thus, any articulation of power can open dialogue between elite and subaltern; 
even the traditional narratives of conquest and rebellion can be subsumed within this larger 
negotiation, as per the old adage by von Clausewitz that “war is the continuation of diplomacy 
by other means” or Foucault’s epigrammatic “power is everywhere because it comes from 
everywhere.”5  The variety of ways people conceive of and communicate authority to others is 
subject of our symposium. It has deeply shaped my own research on Venetian empire in the 
medieval Adriatic, as it has all of the papers presented today at our conference. I hope my 
treatment of Venice’s on-going attempts to rule over the east Adriatic will help spark further 
discussion of contested sovereignty, community, identity and culture. 
 
                                                 
5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Alfred J. Knopf, 1993) ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 77; Michel 
Foucault, History of Sexuality: Volume One: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990) trans. Robert 
Hurley, 122. 
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Theories of Community, Authority and Empire 
Before we begin, it’s worth it to have a discussion of the theories of power, hierarchy and 
community drawn from social scientific disciplines, particularly from sociology and 
anthropology, and humanities, philosophy and cultural criticism. As I mentioned earlier, we now 
understand the creation and maintenance of comprehensive hierarchical systems is rarely as 
straightforward as a single, simple imposition of authority (conquest, charter or purchase). We 
owe much to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber for their analyses the origins of social norms and 
forms of authority. They form the foundation upon which later scholarship, including our own 
today, rest. Weber’s taxonomy of authority stressed the social bases upon which power was 
accepted as legitimate: legal-bureaucratic, traditional and charismatic.6 He asserted that no 
regime represented a pure embodiment of any of these forms and therefore all regimes utilize a 
blend of these authorities. This not only generates an expansive and inclusive formula in which 
allows for the individuality of diverse societies, but it also stresses the necessity of 
communicating power on multiple levels—cultural, legal, militaristic or communal—in order for 
any authority to exist. Clifford Geertz developed this line of thought further by emphasizing the 
power of performance and ritual, not as symbolic, but potent in their ability to shape realities.7 
The participation of the Balinese in the exaltation of their political order makes it real, just as the 
followers of Weber’s charismatic leader generate his/her charisma through their belief.8 The 
expression of authority can be quite formal and institutionalized, as Daniel Pearson, Kara Pierce 
and Brian Trenor have shown us in their papers on bureaucracy in pre- and post-revolutionary 
America and in the Cold War. Or seemingly informal, as in James Fenimore Cooper’s “The 
                                                 
6 Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization (New York: Free Press, 1997), trans. A. M. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 324-406. 
7 Clifford Geertz, “The Politics of Meaning,” THe Interpretations of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 311-
326. 
8 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1980). 
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Lunch’ examined by Jonathan Wilson. Or they can be very physical. These structures of power 
can write themselves on the body in the form of fashion, as we have seen in Alexandra Elias’ 
paper earlier today, or can be mapped out in architecture and geography, as in Tom Guiler’s 
paper on the Oneida colony, Shane Avery & Sravani Biswas’ paper on the Blodgett Primary 
School or Anders Bjornberg’s presentation on the Indian-East Pakistani border. 
If Weber examines the problem from the perspective of the authorities, Durkheim 
provides the other side of the story: the role of individuals in community formation.9 In this, he is 
the direct intellectual ancestor of Michel Foucault. Durkheim’s insistence upon the duality of 
human identity—the individual impulses that bespeak human self-interest versus the urge to 
belong to a community—allowed him to understand social norms to be a continual conversation 
of persuasion to keep the individual within the community. Whether or not we believe in his 
division of modernity and pre-modernity into rational, organic community versus coercive, 
religious community, the inclusiveness of his theory of all forms of human endeavor, including 
labor, belief and government, demonstrates the interconnectivity of assertions of authority in 
political, cultural, economic and social spheres. Michel Foucault would expand upon Durkheim’s 
view by emphasizing the agency, and even complicity of the individual in setting up the power 
structures that constrain it, thus giving a voice to the subaltern, whether it resisted or acquiesced 
to authority.10 Today, papers by Jason Newton, Warren Hinson, Paul Arras and Aaron Hiltner 
has all shown the fraught nature of the dialogue between the individual and the regimes in 
power. 
                                                 
9 Emile Durkheim, On Morality and Society (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), ed. Robert 
N. Bellah. 
10 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, op. cit. See also, Idem, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1990), trans. Alan Sheridan, 2nd Ed; Idem, Madness and Civilization: A History Insanity 
in the Age of Reason (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). 
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The conversation about the composition of authority has found particularly fertile ground 
in the discussions of nationalism, imperialism and colonialism. These issues offer the 
opportunity to examine the creation of comprehensive political, cultural and economic systems. 
Although there are differences between them, the creation of a nation, or a colony, or an empire, 
requires the imposition of a systematizing identities vis-à-vis the newly imposed authorities. If, 
as Benedict Anderson argued, nations are formed over time by intense social and cultural 
conditioning of formerly provincially identified populations, then only time and propaganda 
separates nations from empires.11 In fact, the influential set of articles collected in The Invention 
of Tradition (Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger) demonstrates the similarity of techniques used 
in colonial settings and in the heart of empire, in the African colonies and the Scottish 
Highlands.12 We might say that a loose guideline for the difference between empire-building and 
nation-building is not in the institutional, economic or cultural methods that bind diverse groups 
into notional communities, but in the sense that those communities are sovereign or subservient. 
In the Middle Ages, the line between nations and empires is particularly blurry. James 
Muldoon has observed that when applying modern definitions of empire to the medieval world 
“it becomes clear that institutionally medieval Europe was a period in which virtually all 
attempts at large scale governments were imperial in nature… even if the term empire was not 
employed to describe them.”13 Many studies of how peripheral areas were co-opted by the 
metropoles seem too conscious of the eventual outcome of these efforts: whether the Languedoc 
became southern France or the Holy Land reverted to Muslim control. The study of Norman-
                                                 
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London and 
New York: Verso, 1991). 
12 Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge; New York; Melbourne; 
Madrid: Cambridge UP, 1983). 
13 James Muldoon, Empire and order: the concept of empire, 800-1800 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 59-
63. 
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Angevin Britain has yielded two important studies that tackle this issue. R. R. Davies adopted 
just this argument in his study of Britain under Norman and Angevin rule.14 According to 
Davies, the seeds of English nationalism lies in the attempts of the Plantagenets and their 
supporters to unify and justify their rule through cultural indoctrination; he used the term “first 
English empire” to describe this rule. Gradually, this imperialism yielded the nation of Great 
Britain. James Given has examined the process of state building in Wales and southern France 
and has reached quite a different conclusion. He also presented a center-periphery relationship 
between England/Gwynedd and France/Languedoc; however, Given remained unconvinced that 
his examples revealed any trace of nationalism. He refrained from labeling the systematic 
administrative and political domination by a more powerful metropole of a culturally, socially 
and geographically discrete population; however, the situation he described still fits fairly well 
into models of empire, if not nation-building.15 
 
Coercion: Threatening Violence and Following through on it 
 As with most empires, battles and wars (the old lifeblood of traditional political histories) 
speckle the history of the Venetian maritime empire. Although we have started to look beyond 
this annalistic vision of history, we must examine conquest as a part of the conversation 
articulating power. In fact, in the beginning the Venetian empire relied almost solely upon the 
actions of its fleet to communicate its authority over the Adriatic, or as it was then known, the 
Gulf of Venice. Venetians themselves dated their sovereignty over Dalmatia to the year 1000, 
when the doge Pietro II Orseolo sailed to the rescue of Dalmatian coastal cities beset by violent 
                                                 
14 R. R. Davies, The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles, 1093-1343 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
15 James Given, State and society in medieval Europe: Gwynedd and Languedoc under foreign rule (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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Slavic pirates.16 In gratitude, the cities offered themselves in subjugation to Venetian rule, or so 
the story goes. Whatever the citizens of Zadar, Rab, Osor, Biograd, Split, Sibenik and Dubrovnik 
really thought, the Venetians thought this gave them an empire.  
Yet this claim was all-talk and no-walk, as they say. During the eleventh century, Venice 
continued to do what it had been doing during the 9th and 10th centuries: intermittently policing 
the waters of the Adriatic with occasional naval campaigns to scare off Slavic, Norman and Arab 
pirates. It collected tribute in the form of marten skins from the Kvarner Islands, and in the form 
of oil and cash from the towns of the Istrian peninsula. Native counts and priors governed the 
Istrian and Dalmatian cities in conjunction with councils whose members were drawn from the 
local elite. Naval expeditions, often led by doges or their sons, were only an occasional 
occurence, and offered the doges the chance to raise their prestige as military heroes. In fact, 
Venetians generally got more out of their dominion than they had to put in. As a part of the 
agreement for the protection against pirates offered by Venice, the towns of Dalmatia had to 
contribute at least one ship to Venetian naval expeditions within the Adriatic. Ostensibly, the 
Dalmatian ships were only required to serve in campaigns within the upper Adriatic; however, 
that did not stop Doge Domenico Michiel from levying ships and sailors from Zadar and 
Dubrovnik in his belated expedition to join the Second Crusade. 17  It was only when the 
Hungarian kings began to claim the area and sent in effective military challenges to Venetian 
claims, that the Venetians turned to administration to enforce their claims of power.18 
                                                 
16 Giovanni Diacono. Istoria Veneticorum (Bologna: Zanichelli Editore, 1999), ed. Luigi Andrea Berto, 190-202. 
17 Andrea Dandolo, Andreae Danduli Ducis Venetiarum Chronica per extensum descripta: aa 46-1280 d.C 
(Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1938-1958), ed. Ester Pastorello, ser. Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, vol. XII.1.251; 
Smičiklas, II, 135. 
18 Sime Ljubić, Listine o odnosajih Izmedju Južnoga Slavenstva i Mletačke Republike. Ser. Monumenta spectantia 
historiam slavorum meridionalium (Zagreb: Fr. Župan [Albrecht et Fiedler], 1868), vol. I, 5-6. The document names 
Zadar, Split and Rab specifically as accepting Koloman’s sovereignty, but also notes, “…ibique de Dalmatie 
liberate integra perpertuaque servanda communiter tractantes…” 
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Nevertheless, the threat of violence (and its follow-through) continued to be an important part of 
Venice’s props for communicating power.  
By the fourteenth century, Venice would hit upon an expensive but effective means of 
using the threat of violence to express their power. Just as did the Romans discussed by Charles 
Goldberg and the early Americans discussed by Andrew Fagal, the Venetians used a standing 
military to embody the promise and threat of violence for and by the state. Venice responded 
with a new experiment: the establishment of a permanent military presence by way of garrisons 
established in strategic positions along the frontier of contested authority. The first were created 
in the Istrian mountain fortress of Lovrečica and in the ambitious and rebellious coastal city of 
Koper, the former to protect Venetian-controlled lands from raids by partisans of the patriarch of 
Aquileia and the latter to prevent the rebellion of the city itself.19 The rectors of the rest of Istrian 
coastal towns were required to send men and horses to support the garrison of Lovrečica, and the 
commander of the garrison was given the title of “captain” to indicate his martial, rather than 
governmental, status. The rector of Koper held the title of both “podesta” and “captain.” When a 
permanent garrison of Italian troops was established in Zadar (after the rebellion of 1310-1312), 
the count of Zadar also took on the title and duties of captain.20 When the Venetians captured the 
mountain fortress of Skradin in 1355, they established a garrison for southern Dalmatian, and 
headed it with a captain whose duty it was to guard the frontier with Serbia.21 The Venetian and 
Italian troops stationed in the garrisons greatly expanded the visibility Venetian presence in these 
areas from the small cohorts that had accompanied the rectors in the salad days of the late 
                                                 
19 Archivio di Stato Venezia (hereafter ASV), Collegio, Commissioni Formulari, reg. 1, ff. 67r, 71r, 80r; ASV, 
Collegio, Commissioni ai Rettori, b. 1, fil. 11, f. 1r. 
20 Ljubić, I, 266-271. 
21 Roberto Cessi and Fanny Bennato, eds., Venetiarum historia vulgo Petro Iustiniano Iustiniani. filio adiudicata. 
(Venice: Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezie, 1964) Ser. Monumenti storici pubblicati della Deputazione di 
Storia Patria per le Venezie. Vol. XVIII.247-8. 
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thirteenth century. The composition and positioning of the garrisons communicated as much 
about Venetian ideas of the nature of their empire as the threat of violence in and of itself.  
 
Legislation, Administration and Judgment 
 It’s easy to see the standing armies of garrisons as a bridge between military and 
administration. The appointment of rectors who served both as heads of garrison and colonial 
governors attests to this, just does as the dual role of the American president as chief executive 
and commander in chief.  Yet, the imposition of government goes far beyond a simple threat of 
violence. The creation, enforcement and assessment of laws has an impact as concrete as the use 
of force. 
In my work, I argue that when Venice succeeded in maintaining and expanding its 
presence in Dalmatia, it did so by becoming increasingly and more consistently involved in the 
civil society of the harbor towns. It managed this by sending officials who performed the 
executive and judicial duties as head of the subject communes. Each important town was 
assigned a Venetian count to serve both as the Venetian representative in the area and as the head 
of state of the subject commune with supreme executive and judicial authority. In short, in order 
to keep its claim to sovereignty, Venice had to begin to rule. It failed to gain much traction 
among the rural nobility of coastal and inland Croatia for the same reason; immersed in the 
process of building its own civic culture, the Venetians failed to connect with the interests and 
norms of a feudal elite (not that it tried very hard—the harbor towns were the real targets of 
control).  
The Venetian state injected itself into the government of its subject cities in Dalmatia and 
Istria most conspicuously in the sphere of administration. The Venetians hoped that the dual role 
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served by the rectors, as representatives of the most Serene Republic of Venice and as the heads 
of state of each subject city, would force a similar synonymy of interests between the towns of 
Dalmatia and Istria, and Venice. By the thirteenth century, the Venetians had already begun to 
tap into the nascent communal movement in the east Adriatic towns. They began to figure the 
counts as public servants rather than feudal vassals. Like Italian podestà, they worked hand and 
hand with the municipal council and in accordance with the law. Since this followed the same 
reforms that Venice was instituting for itself in this period, we see a parallel development of 
communal government on both sides of the Adriatic throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. ne telling example of the attempt to code the dual duty of rectors was salary; half was 
paid by the Venetian camera, and the other half by the subject city.22 Deceptively equitable, this 
arrangement presented a far greater burden on the subject cities than on Venice. In 1216, 
Dubrovnik had to impose a special tariff on its own traders in Venice in order to pay for the 
salary of their patrician Venetian count; the Venetian state, supported by the vigorous 
commercial economy built by empire, had no need to impose any such emergency tax.23 
These rectors were not just leaders of their communes, they were also representatives of 
the Venetian state, beholden to Venice’s laws and policy above their obligation to the Dalmatian 
towns. Venetian legislation intruded infrequently in Dalmatian and Istria governance, but when it 
did, it took precedence over any local law. Technically, the rectors were beholden only to the 
doge, but in practice, Venice’s legislative bodies cultivated and pruned the colonies as they did 
the metropole. The Maggior Consiglio (the basic legislative body), the Senato (a smaller but 
higher committee that looked after matters of foreign policy, including the empire) and the 
Council of Ten (extraordinary powers to protect the Venetian state) sent the rectors off with 
                                                 
22 ASV, Collegio, Commissioni Formulari, reg. 1, passim. 
23 Smičiklas, III, 125; Josip Barbarić and Jasna Marković, eds. Codex Diplomaticus Regni Dalmatiae, Chroatiae et 
Slavoniae: supplementa (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1998), vol. I, 73. 
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commissions detailing the Venetian laws they were to enforce while in office.24 The laws ranged 
from enforcing sentences of exile from throughout Venice empire, to suppressing gambling to 
direct trade through the selective use of trade privileges. Further policy could, of course, be sent 
to supplement the commissions at any time and in doing so trumped local legislation. In 1276, 
the Maggior Consiglio ordered the Venetian podestà of Istria to prevent their communes from 
imposing duties on Venetian merchants and from confiscating their goods.25 Although it did not 
restrict the ability of the commune to impose duties on their own citizens or other foreigners, this 
statute confined the Istrian communes’ ability to control any trade save the regional Istrian 
market, especially in conjunction with the trade treaties that disallowed trade outside of the Gulf 
and restricted the Istrian citizens’ access to the marketplace in Venice. This may look familiar to 
those of us who heard the papers by Kara Pierce and Daniel Pearson on the struggles to enforce 
federalism in the early decades of the United States.   
As it did with legislation, Venice positioned itself as the supreme court of appeals for its 
colonies, from Crete to the Terra Ferma to its trade colonies (funduqs) in Muslim and Byzantine 
lands.26 This tack was considerably popular than its administrative and legislative integration 
into local government. As in the city-states of Italy, the townspeople of Dalmatia and Istria 
fought contentiously and persistently with their fellow citizens and with those of neighboring 
communes. The colonial administration also provided a means for judicial dispute settlement, as 
the rectors and also Venice’s own magistracies provided a forum for litigation rather than 
                                                 
24 ASV, Collegio, Commissioni Formulari, reg. 1-2; ASV, Collegio, Commissioni Cariche ai Rettori, b. 1. 
25 Roberto Cessi, ed. Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio Consiglio di Venezia (Bologna: Forni Editore, 1970-1), 
vol. II, 328. “non permittant fieri per comune suum aliquam novitatem super possessione et bonis omnibus… 
hominum Veneciarum, nec mercimoniis et rebus suis omnibus, nec aliquod dacium imponi super eis.” 
26 Monique O’Connell, Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice’s Maritime State (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins UP, 2009); Olivia Remie Constable, Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade 
and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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warfare as a method for dispute settlement. The judicial forum of Venice provided a relative 
unpartisan forum in which to decide disputes.  
Thus, in the 1330s, when the towns of Nin and Zadar were engaged in an ongoing legal 
battle, the Venetian state was able to step in to settle the disputes, and prevent descent into war. 
The counts of Zadar, Šibenik and Trogir were ordered to come together, examine the evidence 
and give sentences for each case.27 The Senato anticipated partisanship on the part of the rectors 
of Zadar and Šibenik. The count of Trogir served as a tie-breaker between the two, since Venice 
stipulated that a majority of the counts was sufficient to pass a sentence. The count of Trogir’s 
role as an arbitrator is confirmed by the Senato’s injunction that his expenses for travel and 
maintenance were to be paid by both Nin and Zadar. 
The success of the Venetian articulation of its power through the provision of judicial 
forum is most dramatically illustrated by its fourteenth-century acquisition of central Dalmatia. 
Until their integration into Venetian dominions in the 1320s, the towns of Trogir, Sebenik and 
Split wrestled each other in constant rotation in rivalry over land, piracy, trade and just plain 
factional hatred. Sibenik, Trogir and Split were famous even within the already contention-
riddled Dalmatian coast for the ferocity and frequency of their conflicts with each other.28 The 
Venetian state preemptively addressed this issue by creating a confederation between the three 
communes, which linked them together in matters of war and diplomacy and provided for a 
forum of dispute-settlement for the inevitable cases that would come up.29 This confederation 
was run cooperatively by the three Venetian rectors of the towns. This system proved so 
successful that it actually outlived Venetian sovereignty in the area. 
                                                 
27 Smičiklas, IX, 194. 
28 Martino da Canale, Les estoires de Venise: Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 
1972), ed. Alberto Limentani, 366; Smičiklas, VI, p. 118-119, 165-166, 169, 204-205, 435; Ibid., VII, pp. 17-18; 
Ibid., VIII, pp. 408, 421-422, 462. 
29 ASV, Miscellanea Atti Diplomatici e Privati, b. 12, no. 437. 
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The availability of appellate justice in Venice itself presented the opportunity for true 
dialogue to take place in the articulation of power. The authority of the Venetian state over both 
the rectors and the subject cities gave room for negotionation of the terms of submission, without 
recourse to rebellion. This occurred notably in Rab, where from 1319 to 1320, the commune 
struggled with its Venetian count, Niccolò Sanudo. Rab contended that the count had been 
elected illegally, without the consent of the commune, and furthermore, had ruled corruptly.30 In 
the end, Venice rendered a judgment not only on the legitimacy of Sanudo’s rule, recalling the 
count, but also on the definitive form of the communal statutes.31 The ducal curia then enshrined 
these statutes, along with the corrections added by the doge and his councilors and their 
approbation by the commune of Rab, in the official state Commemoriali of Venice.32 The 
incorporation of the statutes of a subject commune in the official state archives highlights the 
trend towards direct involvement by the Venetian state in the government of Dalmatia and Istria. 
This type of intervention into internal civic government represented an imposition on both the 
autonomy of the subject commune and on the office of rectors.  
 Thus in its penetration into all aspects of law and order in Dalmatia and Istria, the 
Venetian state communicated its authority to its subject in those places. But we have also seen 
that in every space they could find, especially within the judicial sphere, the people of these 
towns talked back to Venetian authority, and in this negotiation, made their own mark upon the 
terms of power.  
 
 
                                                 
30 Ljubić, I, 304-307 
31 Ljubić, I, 315-318. 
32 R. Predelli, I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia. Regesti (Venice, 1876), I, 219-220. Further 
evidence of the event’s importance was the inclusion of the “original” grant of rights to comital election from the 
doge to Rab in Andrea Dandolo’s Chronica Extensa (p. 248). 
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Official Culture: Producing Justifications of Power 
 The official and formal forum of governance was only one of the ways in which Venice 
told the Dalmatians and Istrians of their dominion. The Venetians also expressed their authority 
in words, rituals and images, in other words in the creation of the officially sanctioned 
production of power. Even now, one can track Venetian empire in the Italian peninsula through 
the Adriatic and east Mediterranean by the sporelike scattering of winged Lions of St. Mark in 
the architecture of Iraklion, Coron and Modon, Corfu and Verona.33  
 The Venetians attempted to seed devotion to Saint Mark in a similar way through 
penetration of local ritual. The anecdote with which I began this talk is but one extreme example 
of the many attempts, some successful and some not, that the Venetians made to get the citizens 
of Zadar, Dubrovnik and the other towns of Dalmatia to internalize their subordination to 
Venetian sovereignty.  
 In 1204, the Venetians managed to get the Zaratines to repopulate the city that the 
Crusaders had captured in 1202. In the treaty of submission that followed the reentry of the 
Zaratines to the city, Venice penetrated the rhythm of Zadar’s civic rituals as well. The Zaratine 
clerics were required to sing lauds for the doge, the patriarch of Grado, the archbishop of Zadar 
and the count every Christmas and Easter.34 Given this situation, the story with which I began 
this talk, that of Marino Dandolo and Johannes Gardiaca’s attempt to impose their presence on 
the city’s monastic festivals, seems less of an aberrant attack and more of an extension of a trend. 
 The Venetians further developed this use of civic ritual when the southern Dalmatian 
town of Dubrovnik entered its dominion. After a rocky start and a rebellion in 1231, Venice 
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imposed the same conditions on Dubrovnik as it had on Zadar, only more deeply entrenching 
Venetian dominion within the civic life of the city. The clergy had to sing lauds to the doge, 
patriarch of Grado, bishop of Dubrovnik and count not only on Easter and Christmas, but also on 
the feast of St. Blaise (Vlahe), its patron saint. The treaty also created a completely new civic 
ritual. From this point, all men thirteen years old and above had to swear fidelity to the doge and 
the population renewed their oath every ten years.35 Whether this truly deepened Dubrovnikan 
loyalty to Venice or not is debatable. However, it certainly would have reminded them of their 
obligations to their Venetian overlords. 
Proving one’s authority to subjects was one matter, proving it to oneself is another. Over 
and over again, the Venetians sought to tell themselves that their empire was legitimate. They 
started with the title of the doge, their leader and emblem of the serene republic. The official title 
of the doge from 1204 to 1358 was “Duke of the Venetians, of Dalmatia and Croatia, and of one 
quarter and one eighth of the Roman empire.” It read like a resume of Venetian acquisition of the 
empire, with the colonies just as important to the identity of the doge as the home city. In fact, 
one of the most humiliating moments of Venetian imperial experience was the cession of their 
claim to Dalmatia to the crown of Hungary in 1358. This loss of empire was reflected in the 
dogal title, which they truncated to “Duke of the Venetians, et cetera” until such a time (the early 
15th century) when they could recover their losses.36  
The Venetians were equally self-aware about the lack of a classical precedent for their 
empire. Stuck between the Byzantine Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, they were hardly able 
to paint themselves as the successors to the Caesars. Instead of using classical precedent then, the 
Venetians used the language of the divine. In the teleological narratives of chronicles and the 
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florid formulations of diplomata, Venice created myths of protection, consent and divine order 
for their empire. The Venetian state always hoped and wished for Dalmatia to exist in a state of 
eager subjection, and the Dalmatians were willing, when it suited their purposes, to take on 
Venice as their protector. Because the Venetians wished to believe their regime as just and 
divinely sanctioned, the Dalmatians, as their potential subjects, were placed in a role equivalent 
to that of the human soul. On one side, rebelliousness sired by arrogance led them astray, away 
from union with their rightful lords. On the other side, hardship caused by this recalcitrance 
prompted a penitence that eventually led the Dalmatians willingly back to Venetian rule. Just as 
human souls would constantly fall from and then reach for a state of grace until the second 
coming, the tale of Dalmatian submission to Venice repeated itself cyclically. It took on a certain 
reliability: the Dalmatians would always rebel, but then they would always be brought back to 
the fold. 
In the 1313 submission treaty of Zadar, the Zaratines once more begged humbly to 
subject themselves to the doge and commune of Venice. The treaty embellished the theme of 
voluntary petition by an extended metaphor that made Venice the father and Zadar the long-
awaited prodigal son. The reconciliation of Zadar with Venice was portrayed thusly in the 
document: 
The father, full of mercy, grace and truth, knows of the fiction and the fragility of the 
human condition, both of which deviate away from law and justice at the suggestion of 
the one who polluted the earliest order with the poisoned apple. He does not wish the 
death of the sinner. So that the sinner be converted and live, the father recalls him 
mercifully to the path of truth.37  
 
Filial and parental loves were presented as a reciprocal obligation; affection, rather than 
chastisement, characterized this purported familial bond between Venice and Zadar. Like the 
prodigal son, when the Zaratines were deserted by their Hungarian allies, they “relied upon the 
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habitual grace of the Venetians and freely gave over the city of Zadar to the Venetian captain.”38  
This insistence on willing consent almost converged on the absurd; just as the salary of rectors 
gave the illusion of equality even as it imposed hardship in reality, the Venetian forced the cities 
they conquered (especially the ones who had rebelled) to give their “free consent” to join 
Venetian dominion. For instance, the Historia Venetiarum tells us that after the 1347 siege of 
Zadar, the Venetian forces received the city’s ambassadors, who were crawling on their knees , 
begging for mercy. The ambassadors then “freely” placed Zadar and all of its jurisdictions under 
dogal dominion.39 
Yet once again, the Venetian need to believe in free consent gave their subject some 
room to negotiate. This free consent protected the Dalmatian and Istrian communes to a certain 
extent as well as assuring the Venetian state of the legality of its acquisition, for it gave at least 
lip service to Dalmatian agency. The fact that dominion depended upon treaties and diplomata 
meant that consent could be revoked. And it was. 
 
Talking Back: The Subaltern and Rebellion 
 Despite the constancy of its efforts to communicate its sovereignty over the east Adriatic, 
some portion of Dalmatia and Istria rebelled with clockwork timing every decade or so. In doing 
so, they did not necessarily seek to total revolution and overthrow of the regimes that sought to 
control them, but to re-open negotiations. Because Venice required treaties of submission and 
contracts to construct its empire, the act of rebellion negated the previous contract and opened 
the possibility for new terms.  
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 In the early years of its rule in Dalmatia, the Venetians attempted to impose feudal style 
rectors who held almost unlimited power over their regimes. This imposition of self-important 
and exploitative counts pleased the Dalmatian cities not at all—especially the town of Zadar. 
Like Venice, they partook in the growing movement towards the creation of civic communities, 
especially communes. The oppressive actions of Domenico Morosini as the count of Zadar, and 
Ruggiero Morosini as count of Osor led to a large-scale rebellion that successfully freed northern 
Dalmatia (save the island of Rab) from Venetian control for twenty years, until the time of the 
Fourth Crusade. Clearly the mimicry of feudal lordships was an unsuccessful model—a failed 
experiment as it were. When the Venetians finally recaptured the city with the help of the knights 
of the Fourth Crusade, they had to try new terms. They did so be creating a treaty of submission 
in which both sides had both duties and rights. The Zaratines were given the right to select their 
own count—as long as he was Venetian. They were likewise required to select a Venetian 
archbishop. Thus the two most important civic leaders would be Venetians. This did not please 
the Zaratines too much better, for they rebelled again in 1242 and had to be persuaded with force 
(!) to rejoin Venetian dominions. Afterward, it received a new concession: rectors who served 
only two-year terms, rather than holding the office for a life term. This prevented any single 
Venetian from gaining too much power and forced the counts to rely upon the local elite much 
more for their expertise. The Zaratines had gotten this idea from their neighbors to the south and 
comrades in Venetian dominion, the Dubrovnikans. After their rebellion in 1231, Dubrovnik had 
been granted the concession of two-year term counts. Furthermore, from this point, the Venetian 
counts swore oaths to serve the commune of Dubrovnik, as well as the doge.40 These oaths were 
preserved in the Dubrovnikan archives as official records of the commune. 
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 In other less violent ways as well, the people of Dalmatia and Istria made the Venetian 
colonial endeavor a dialogue rather than a soliloquy. The communal statutes of Piran, Dubrovnik 
and Zadar demonstrate that the cities sought to carve out their own municipal authority, free 
from interference, if not oversight from Venetian authority. They sought to limit the actions of 
the rector’s retinue, if not the rector himself. For instance, the Maggior Consiglio of Rab decreed 
that the count’s bodyguard should not be allowed to serve as the night watch, nor leave the 
confines of the comital palace after dark.41  
Their willingness to litigate against the corruption of Venetian officials in ecclesiastical 
and secular courts also spoke to their agency, and the acceptance by Venetians of these charges 
as potentially valid demonstrates that they too took seriously the articulation of power as a 
negotiation. My earlier story of Rab’s extensive effort to get rid of Count Niccolo Sanudo 
provides a perfect example of this. In fact, sometimes charges of rectorial corruption were 
brought up as defense in cases of rebellion, with mixed results. After several noblemen and 
ranking communal officials of Izola were charged with attacking and attempting to murder 
Podestà Marco Zorzi and his household, they brought charges to the Avogaria di Comun that 
Zorzi had been acting against the honor of Venice and the terms of his commission. After 
investigation, the Maggior Consiglio ruled that Zorzi was indeed guilty of corruption. However, 
his only punishment was a fine of 300 lira. On the other hand, his attackers were subject to 
lifelong banishment from Izola and all Venetian dominions; their accomplices were stripped of 
office and disqualified from election for four years as well as suffering yearlong terms of exile 
from Izola.42 Obviously, the peaceful approach of the Rabans proved more successful than the 
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case of Izola, but both show that the Dalmatians and Istrians judged for themselves the 
legitimacy of the authority imposed on them by Venice.  
Conclusion 
 Medieval Venetian rule in the east Adriatic is only one case among the many that 
demonstrate that the imposition of authority was not a forceful and extended monologue but an 
attempt by parties unequal in resources but not in agency to find a language in which to 
communicate. Through ritual and rebellion, law and literature, gold and guilt, the articulation of 
power required negotiation and participation between all involved.  
